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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the decision-theoretic status of risk attitudes.
I start by providing evidence showing that the risk attitude concepts
do not play a major role in the axiomatic analysis of the classic models
of decision-making under risk. This can be interpreted as reflecting the
neutrality of these models between the possible risk attitudes. My cen-
tral claim, however, is that such neutrality needs to be qualified and the
axiomatic relevance of risk attitudes needs to be re-evaluated accord-
ingly. Specifically, I highlight the importance of the conditional vari-
ation and the strengthening of risk attitudes, and I explain why they
establish the axiomatic significance of the risk attitude concepts. I also
present several questions for future research regarding the strengthen-
ing of risk attitudes.
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Introduction
This paper focuses on choice under risk. In decision-theoretic terminology,
risk refers to when the decision-maker faces options that constitute ran-
dom prospects on a given set of possible results, and the prospects follow a
known probability distribution. This is exemplified in games of chance such
as dice, cards, or roulette. Playing such games, the decision-maker wins or
loses money randomly (unlike in choice under certainty). However (unlike
in choice under uncertainty), her odds follow known probability distribu-
tions. They are determined by the particular chance mechanism she is con-
fronted with, i.e., the number of faces on the dice, the number and kinds of
available cards, or the roulette table layout.
It is well known that the attitude towards risk is one of the topics consid-
ered in this branch of decision theory. In decision-theoretic terminology, risk
attitude refers to technical concepts capturing parts of our intuitive psychol-
ogy regarding the various temperaments that can be exhibited in situations
like the ones above. For instance, some love gambling despite the eventuality
of going bankrupt, others prefer to play it safe whenever possible, and still
others act as if they were altogether insensitive to any such feature of their
choice situation. In the present paper, I assess the significance of the technical
concepts echoing those intuitive ideas in decision theory. I offer a new concep-
tual perspective on pre-existing results, which I select, bring together, and
interpret. I also articulate some of the open questions these results lead to.
Whatever their domain of interest (be it certainty, risk, or uncertainty),
decision theorists are primarily concerned with analyzing decision models. A
decision model can be thought of as an algorithm for evaluating options. In
the case of risk, examples include computing the expected value of some util-
ity function on the set of possible results, calculating this expectation with
respect to some transformation of the known probabilities, or proposing some
way of combining both the expectation and the variance of the utility val-
ues. More often than not, decision theorists introduce or even discover models
directly from such a numerical perspective. But their specific task is to char-
acterize each numerical form of evaluation by a few basic properties, namely,
those displayed by the preferences of a decision-maker to whom the exam-
ined model would apply. This requires, if possible, proving a representation
theorem showing how the numerical evaluation reflects structural aspects
of the underlying preferences. To this extent, decision theory is essentially
a development of representational measurement theory. More generally, it
is an application of the axiomatic method.1 Axiomatic analysis, as I will
henceforth summarize the decision theorists’ task, enables decision models
to be compared with one another. Rigorously speaking, the numerical forms
1For the authoritative exposition of the representational theory of measurement, see
the Foundations of Measurement trilogy (starting with Krantz et al., 1971).
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of evaluation they are associated with are not directly comparable. How-
ever, once they are translated into the common language of preference, one
can identify the true differences between them. Thus, for decision theorists,
the most significant properties of preference are those on the basis of which
decision models can be axiomatically distinguished from one another.
In this paper, I apply the axiomatic criterion of significance introduced
above to assess the status of the risk attitude concepts in decision theory. I
start by recalling their technical definitions in a preliminary section. Then,
following a deliberately naïve baseline analysis, I provide evidence showing
that these concepts do not play any axiomatic role in the theory of decision-
making under risk. At this juncture, I stress that the risk attitude concepts do
not seem able to account for the fundamental divide between expected utility
and the non-expected utility models. This fact is recognized in the current
literature, but it deserves to be better highlighted and detailed. To this end, I
provide an illustrative discussion of the Allais paradoxes (Allais, 1953), which
I enrich in the subsequent sections of my paper. Next, I show that following
a second, more thorough analysis, different and less familiar conclusions
prevail. Specifically, I show that in at least two respects, which pertain to
what I call, respectively, the conditional variation and the strengthening of
risk attitudes, axiomatic analysis can rely on risk attitudes to distinguish
decision models from one another.
In providing this thorougher analysis of risk attitudes, my paper relies
on two strands of literature. The first strand of literature analyzes decision
models by means of so-called conditional certainty equivalents (see espe-
cially Machina, 1982, Chew and Epstein, 1989, Chew et al., 1993). Unlike
the previous contributors to this literature, I show its conceptual importance
for assessing the status of risk attitudes in axiomatic decision theory. The
second strand of literature aims at algebraically characterizing each of the
risk attitudes, when the numerical framework of a given decision model is
taken for granted (for a review of such results, see, e.g., Chateauneuf et
al., 1997). More systematically than the previous contributors to this litera-
ture, I show that such algebraic characterizations lead to a general axiomatic
typology of the existing decision models. In particular, in this context, I of-
fer a new discussion of the recent cautious expected utility model (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al., 2015), which proves instrumental in establishing the generality
of the typology in question. This discussion also provides new evidence in
support of the exceptional flexibility of the rank-dependent utility model
(first introduced in Quiggin, 1982). These two strands of literature lead to
the most accurate assessment of the decision-theoretic status of the risk at-
titudes concepts. Admittedly, this final assessment amounts to more of a
qualification, than a rejection of the naïve baseline assessment which I am
going to sketch first. However, as I will show, it opens many new theoretical
perspectives that, to the best of my knowledge, are yet to be explored.
2
1 The Risk Attitude Concepts
1.1 The Underlying Framework
The mathematical framework underlying the present paper is as follows.
Take a real interval C.2 For convenience, I will assume that it is closed and
bounded. Let ∆(C) be the set of all finite-support probability distributions
on C. For any c ∈ C, denote by δc the degenerate probability distribution
with support {c}. Call C the set of results, and ∆(C) the set of lotteries.
Notice that, in this framework, any lottery P ∈ ∆(C) has a well-defined
mathematical expectation, denoted here by E(P ), and that under the form
of the degenerate lottery δE(P ), E(P ) is itself one of the lotteries. Take <,
a binary preference relation on ∆(C). Let ≻ and ∼ be the strict preference
and the indifference sub-relations, respectively. Assume that < is complete,
transitive, and continuous in the topology of weak convergence. Assume also
that < is strictly increasing in C, interpreted by default as a set of monetary
amounts, and identified with the set of degenerate lotteries δc, and that <
respects first-order stochastic dominance.3 For the sake of brevity, I will call
any such preference relation classic.
There are of course more general conditions than the ones given above.
First, the theory of decision-making under risk can be developed with re-
spect to arbitrary sets of results, such as finite sets of non-numerical entities.
For instance, the options could be lotteries over heterogeneous discrete con-
sumer goods. This implies that in general, the decision theorist’s lotteries
have no well-defined mathematical expectation and that even when they do,
the mathematical expectations are not among the options over which the
decision-maker’s preferences are defined. Second, and independently of the
previous point, although the preferences underlying most models of decision-
making under risk are classic ones, such is not the case of all. Setting apart
the fact that preferences are monotonically increasing in C, there are major
exceptions pertaining to each of the properties introduced above.4
2For simplicity, in this paper, C will always be taken in R+. This is to set aside a specific
set of issues, namely, the possible asymmetries between how decision-makers consider
gains, and how they consider losses (making the conventional assumption that the former
should be mapped onto R+, and the latter onto R−). Such asymmetries have been discussed
at length with respect to the risk attitudes (see in particular the so-called fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes emphasized by Tversky and Kahneman, e.g., 1992, p. 306).
3For any lottery P , let FP : R→ [0, 1] be its cumulative distribution function. I will
say that P dominates Q in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance if FP (x) ≤ FQ(x)
for all x ∈ R, and this inequality is strict for some x. The fact that < respects first-order
stochastic dominance thus defined (in the sense that P ≻ Q whenever P dominates Q
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) entails that < is strictly increasing in C
(i.e., for all c, c′ ∈ C, if c > c′, then δc ≻ δc′). This is a natural assumption to make if c
refers to money or, more generally, any continuous good.
4For instance, the preferences underlying the models of choice under risk based on
regret are intransitive, and therefore non-classic (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1982, Loomes and
Sugden, 1982).
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However restrictive, these conditions fit the purposes of the discussion of
my paper. They imply the following fact, on which I will rely in subsequent
analysis: for any lottery P , there is a unique result c such that P ∼ δc.
Call this result c the certainty equivalent of P for the decision-maker char-
acterized by the preference relation <, which can be written as CE(P ) = c.
Given a preference relation <, define a certainty equivalent function as a
function CE : ∆(C) → C such that CE(P ) ≥ CE(Q) ⇔ P < Q, for all
P,Q ∈ ∆(C), and CE(δc) = c, for any c ∈ C. Any classic preference relation
can be associated with exactly one certainty equivalent function.5
1.2 Definitions of Risk Attitudes
Thanks to the framework sketched in the previous section, one can introduce
the prevailing concepts of risk attitude.6 What is under discussion is in fact
a family of definitions. But all the definitions follow the same logical pat-
tern. First, there is the specification of one kind of risk reduction that can
be offered to the decision-maker. Second, there is a classification of decision-
makers according to whether they opt for or against such risk reductions,
whenever offered.
The most intuitive kind of risk reduction is total risk reduction. I will say
that this kind of risk reduction is available to the decision-maker whenever
she is offered to choose between a lottery, P , and its mathematical expec-
tation given as a riskless option, δE(P ). Accordingly, call a decision-maker
weakly risk averse if δE(P ) < P for any P . In the special cases in which, in
addition, one such preference is strict for some lottery P , call the decision-
maker weakly strictly risk averse.7 Alternatively, call her weakly risk seeking
if δE(P ) 4 P (with a transparent strict variant), and weakly risk neutral if
δE(P ) ∼ P , for any P . As this paper focuses on classic preferences, one could
also introduce these concepts by comparing mathematical expectations with
certainty equivalents. By the definition of the certainty equivalent function,
δE(P ) < P if and only if δE(P ) ≥ CE(P ). Therefore, weak risk aversion ob-
tains if and only if the decision-maker’s preferences are such that, for any P ,
δE(P ) −CE(P ) ≥ 0. Similar inequalities hold for the other two attitudes
defined above.
The risk attitudes defined above are deemed weak because they per-
tain to very specific risk reductions, namely, total ones. In order to in-
troduce stronger risk attitudes, one must first provide a general definition
of risk reductions, that covers potentially partial risk reductions as well. I
5For a standard proof, see, e.g., Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015, Appendix B, Step 1. This
result is essentially an application of Debreu’s 1964 theorem regarding the existence of
a continuous utility function. As I will highlight later, a certainty equivalent function is
nothing but a particular utility function representing <.
6A standard exposition of these definitions can be found in Cohen, 1995, Section 1.
7An alternative definition would require that δE(P ) ≻ P , not for some P , but for all P .
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will say that P is related to Q by an arbitrary risk reduction (i.e., that Q
is a so-called mean-preserving spread of Q), which can be symbolized by
writing P RRA Q, if the following condition obtains.
8 For any enumeration
{c1, ..., cn} of the support of P , there exists a corresponding set {L1, ..., Ln}
of lotteries such that Q can be identified as follows:
Q =
n∑
i=1
P (ci)Li with E(Li) = ci for any i = 1, ..., n. (1)
For instance, P = (12 : 15,
1
2 : 5) is related to Q = (
1
4 : 25,
3
4 : 5) in this way:
the lotteries L1 = (
1
2 : 25,
1
2 : 5) and L2 = (1 : 5) lead to the desired identi-
fication.9 Total risk reduction, henceforth symbolized by RRT , corresponds
to the particular case where P = δE(Q), with L = Q being the only auxiliary
lottery, as when Q is compared with P ′ = δE(Q) = (1 : 10). Call a decision-
maker strongly risk averse if P < Q whenever P RRA Q. This also covers
cases of partial risk reductions, hence the fact that this form of risk aversion
is considered to be stronger than weak risk aversion. Alternatively, call the
decision-maker strongly risk seeking if P 4 Q, and strongly risk neutral if
P ∼ Q, in each case for all P,Q such that P RRA Q. Again, definitions in-
volving certainty equivalents are available. For instance, strong risk aversion
obtains if and only if CE(P )− CE(Q) ≥ 0 whenever P RRA Q.
Many conceivable risk reductions are more specific than the arbitrary
ones, but more general than the total ones. For the purposes of this paper,
it suffices to consider only one such intermediate case, which requires that
the risk reduction be monotonic, symbolized by RRM . Intuitively, this kind
of risk reduction is especially homogeneous. Technically, given two lotteries
P and Q such that P RRA Q, the additional requirement is that each in-
terquantile interval of P be no greater than that of Q. This implies that Q
cannot have any hedging properties with respect to P , which can occur when
8One can also say that P dominates Q in the sense of second-order stochastic domi-
nance, applied to lotteries having the same mathematical expectation. In economics, the
concept of mean-preserving spread dates back to Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970. The defini-
tion in (1), which corresponds to the simplest case possible, compares most directly to the
one presented in Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970, I.1 and III.4. While the two definitions are
equivalent, the one given here is simpler, and also less restrictive in that it is compatible
with C being taken in R+, i.e., having no element in R− (more on this in footnote 2).
9The so-called principle of reduction of compound lotteries is assumed in (1) and, more
generally, throughout my paper. In particular, I will not investigate whether some risk at-
titude patterns can be related to patterns of violations of the principle of reduction of
compound lotteries. Such violations have been systematically explored in the literature
(see, e.g., Segal, 1990, and more recently Dillenberger and Segal, 2015). But to my knowl-
edge, they have never been explored with reference to the risk attitude concepts introduced
in this section. This would be a particularly interesting (and challenging) research topic.
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P is a non-monotonic risk reduction of Q.10 For instance, taking the preced-
ing lotteries P and Q, one can check that P is not monotonically less risky
than Q, whereas it would be so compared to Q′ = (12 : 20,
1
2 : 0). The generic
definition in (1) would then apply with the lotteries L1 = (
3
4 : 20,
1
4 : 0) and
L2 = (
1
4 : 20,
3
4 : 0), and the monotonicity condition on the interquantile in-
tervals would be satisfied. In this paper, call a decision-maker moderately
risk averse if P < Q whenever P RRM Q. Likewise, refer to the correspond-
ing attitudes as moderate risk seeking and moderate risk neutrality.11 Again,
alternative definitions involving certainty equivalents are available.
The various kinds of risk attitudes thus introduced form a united fam-
ily of concepts. The following two remarks highlight this point in different
ways. First, these concepts pertain to various kinds of risk reduction that
are logically related to one another. Total risk reduction is a refinement of
monotonic risk reduction, which is itself a refinement of arbitrary risk re-
duction. As a result, the various strengths of risk aversion or risk seeking
are similarly related from a logical point of view. Any strongly risk averse
decision-maker must also be moderately so, and any moderately risk averse
decision-maker must also be weakly so. However, as will be emphasized later,
the converse implications do not hold in general, i.e., they do not hold in
all decision models. It is clear from the definitions above that one can con-
sistently accept all total risk reductions and refuse some monotonic ones, or
accept all monotonic risk reductions and refuse some arbitrary ones. Thus,
the various strengths of risk aversion are logically related exactly as follows:
strong aversion ⇒ moderate aversion ⇒ weak aversion,
strong aversion : moderate aversion : weak aversion. (2)
The same analysis applies to the various strengths of risk seeking. Finally,
all brands of risk neutrality are equivalent provided indifference is transi-
tive. Classic preferences have transitive indifference sub-relations. Accord-
ingly, from now on in this paper I will discuss risk neutrality without further
qualification, i.e., without specifying any underlying kind of risk reduction.
Second, the concepts above are traditionally presented as pertaining to
10The defining condition on interquantile intervals is as follows. For any P , let
F−1P : (0, 1)→ R be its (generalized) inverse distribution function. Then, P RRM Q if
P RRA Q and, for all p, q ∈ (0, 1) such that p < q, F−1P (q)− F−1P (p) ≤ F−1Q (q)− F−1Q (p).
One can also say that Q is more dispersed than P in the sense of Bickel and Lehman,
applied to lotteries having the same mathematical expectation. This kind of risk reduction
is called “monotonic” because, making explicit an underlying state space, P and Q can be
related to “co-monotonic” Savagian acts (for a definition, see Schmeidler, 1989, p. 575). For
more details on this kind of risk reduction, see, e.g., Chateauneuf et al., 1997, p. 29.
11Unlike “monotonic”, “moderate” fits the prevailing terminology regarding the “weak”
and the “strong” attitudes, and it makes transparent the logical links given in (2) above.
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absolute risk attitude. This is by way of contrast with the more general
concepts of comparative risk attitude, that are also examined in the litera-
ture.12 The comparative concepts of risk attitude can be used not only to
introduce the absolute ones, but also to highlight their systematic unity. In
the framework of the present paper, I will say that decision-maker D is more
risk averse than decision-maker D′ if, for any P , CED(P ) ≤ CED′(P ).
13 The
intuition is that D is more risk averse than D′ if, for any lottery P , D is
ready to accept at most as much as D′ in order to avoid the intrinsic risk-
iness of P by receiving, instead of P , some sure amount CE(P ). Whatever
the underlying kind of risk reduction, a risk averse (respectively, seeking)
decision-maker can be characterized by her being more (respectively, less)
risk averse than a risk neutral decision-maker. Denote by D0 a risk-neutral
decision-maker. Recall that, by definition, CED0(P ) = E(P ) for any P . Ob-
serve that a weak risk averter is a decision-maker D− such that, for any P ,
CED−(P ) ≤ CED0(P ). Likewise, a weak risk seeker is a decision-maker D+
such that, for any P , CED+(P ) ≥ CED0(P ). To this extent, in all that pre-
cedes, there are in fact only two basic ideas from which all the other ones can
be derived, namely, risk neutrality and comparative risk aversion (or seek-
ing). However, as will be emphasized later, a decision-maker D can be more
(or less) risk averse than decision-maker D′ even though neither D norD′ dis-
play any of the absolute risk attitudes previously listed. Indeed, it might be
that for all P , CED(P ) ≤ CED′(P ), but with CED(Q) ≤ CED′(Q) < E(Q)
for some Q and E(R) < CED(R) ≤ CED′(R) for some R. This would illus-
trate comparative risk aversion while also excluding any form of risk seeking
or risk aversion. This explains why the concepts of comparative risk attitude
are taken to be more general and flexible than those of absolute risk attitude.
2 Axiomatic Analysis vs. Risk Attitude Analysis
On the face of it, the axiomatic analysis of decision-making under risk does
not rely on the risk attitude concepts introduced in the previous section. As
the present section details, this is what one can conclude from examining
the traditional representation theorems of the theory of choice under risk.
Most of these theorems can be understood as proceeding in two steps. The
first step is common across models. It consists in building a generic utility
representation, like the ones examined in the theory of riskless choice. This
step can be taken as given in this paper. For any classic preference relation <,
there exists a utility function v : ∆(C)→ R such that the following holds:
12The contrast is also with the more specialized concepts of relative risk attitudes (in
which case, “relative” means “relative to a given underlying wealth of the decision-maker”).
13Comparative risk aversion can be given a much more general definition (see Yaari, 1969
and, building on this contribution, Bommier et al., 2012, Section 3). This more general
definition, which is the truly fundamental one, can be introduced even when one cannot
introduce certainty equivalent functions or, indeed, the absolute risk attitudes themselves.
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P < Q⇔ v(P ) ≥ v(Q), ∀P,Q ∈ ∆(C). (3)
For instance, the certainty equivalent function associated with < can serve
as one such generic representation.
The second step introduces the analytical form of v specific to each
model. The best-known specification is that of the expected utility model.
Given any pair of lotteries P,Q ∈ ∆(C), and any number α ∈ [0, 1], de-
note by αP + (1− α)Q the convex combination of P and Q with respec-
tive weights α and (1− α). Notice that ∆(C) is closed under this oper-
ation of convex combination. In expected utility, the proposed analytical
form is that v in (3) be linear in probabilities, i.e., for all P,Q ∈ ∆(C) and
any α ∈ [0, 1], we have v [αP + (1− α)Q] = αv(P ) + (1− α)v(Q). For this
functional form to hold, it is necessary and sufficient to require that classic
preferences respect so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) indepen-
dence, i.e., for all P,Q,R ∈ ∆(C) and any α ∈ (0, 1], P < Q if and only if
αP +(1−α)R < αQ+(1−α)R.14 The other models of decision-making un-
der risk are the non-expected utility models, in which v in (3) is not linear in
probabilities. These models predominantly rely on weakened forms of VNM
independence (now short for: the respect of VNM independence). For in-
stance, the condition can be imposed only when R = P or R = Q, which de-
fines the so-called betweenness property. This weakening underlies, e.g., the
much-discussed disappointment aversion model. Alternatively, the condition
can be restricted to when the convex combination with R preserves the pref-
erential ranks of the elements in the support of P and Q, which defines
the so-called co-monotonic weakening of VNM independence. This weak-
ening is characteristic of the empirically prevailing rank-dependent utility
model. Among many conceivable generalizations, these two generalizations
of VNM independence have received the most interest in the literature.15
14Notice however that together with the other defining properties of classic preferences,
the respect of VNM independence entails that of first-order stochastic dominance. For a
proof of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, see, e.g., Fishburn, 1970, Chapter 8.
15Betweenness is satisfied if for all P,Q ∈ ∆(C), and any α ∈ (0, 1], P < Q if and only
if P < αP + (1 − α)Q < Q. On the betweenness branch of non-expected utility theory,
see Dekel, 1986 and Chew, 1989. On the disappointment aversion model in particular,
see Gul, 1991. Next, some notation is needed to introduce the co-monotonic branch of
non-expected utility theory. Given a lottery P , denote by {cp1, ..., cpn} its support, order-
ing it (without loss of generality) so that δcp
1
> ... > δcp
n
, and accordingly let P denote
(cp1, p1; ...; c
p
n, pn). Take Q = (c
q
1 , p1; ...; ci, pi; ...; c
q
n, pn), R = (c
r
1, p1; ...; ci, pi; ...; c
r
n, pn),
Q′ = (cq1 , p1; ...; c
′
i, pi; ...; c
q
n, pn), R
′ = (cr1, p1; ...; c
′
i, pi; ...; c
r
n, pn) (i.e., the common result ci
is replaced by the common result c′i at the same i-th preferential rank). The co-monotonic
weakening of VNM independence requires that, for all such Q,R,Q′, R′, Q < R if
and only if Q′ < R′. On this property and the rank-dependent utility model, see,
e.g., Chateauneuf, 1999. For a classic decision model contained in neither the betweenness,
nor the co-monotonic branch of non-expected utility theory, see, e.g., the recent model of
Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015 (which I will discuss in Section 3.2).
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From an axiomatic point of view, this second step is crucial. Its function
is to shed light on how the various decision models differ from one another. It
is apparent from the above that the risk attitude concepts do not appear in
this key step – at least as it is construed in traditional axiomatizations. These
concepts also seem unlikely to appear in any alternative axiomatizations that,
contrary to the traditional ones, would try to emphasize the role of risk at-
titudes. Indeed, there seems to be no systematic link between any particular
model of decision-making under risk and any particular risk attitude. Yet
such a link seems necessary for any such alternative analysis to be carried
out successfully. Admittedly, there is one remarkable implication. Take a
decision-maker with classic preferences. If she is risk neutral, then she is an
expected utility maximizer; equivalently, if she is a non-expected utility max-
imizer, then she cannot be risk neutral.16 However, the converse implication
does not hold, as illustrated by the well-known possibility that an expected
utility maximizer is strictly risk averse or risk seeking. More generally, it is a
fact that no known model of decision-making under risk imposes any of the
attitudes previously listed. Even when those attitudes can be introduced, as
is the case in the framework of the present paper, all classic models of choice
under risk can accommodate non-classifiable preferences, i.e., preferences
that would display none of the introduced attitudes. This can be established
by algebraic examples, by building on the available results regarding the
characterization of the various risk attitudes within each decision model. It
suffices to pick for each model a particular functional form that does not
display any of the properties identified in those results.17
This apparent mismatch between what axiomatic analysis needs and
what the risk attitude concepts have to offer can be illustrated more con-
cretely. Consider the fundamental divide between expected and non-expected
utility. It is customary to introduce it through the Allais paradoxes, which
are combinations of preferences that seem internally consistent but are in-
consistent with VNM independence. Non-expected utility models explore
various ways of weakening this property partly because they want to al-
low for these combinations of preferences. The paradoxical preferences, as I
will call them here, illustrate how restrictive expected utility really is, and
they inspire the various non-expected utility models. Were the risk atti-
tude concepts axiomatically relevant, they should be able to shed light on
the paradoxical preferences, displayed next in Figures 1 and 2.18
16Given how risk neutrality, the certainty equivalent function, and mathematical expec-
tations are defined, one can check that, for all P,Q,R ∈ ∆(C) and any α ∈ (0, 1], P < Q
if and only if E(P ) ≥ E(Q) if and only if E[αP + (1 − α)R] ≥ E[αQ + (1 − α)R] if and
only if αP + (1 − α)R < αQ + (1 − α)R. In the above formulation of the contrapositive
form of this implication, one should interpret “non-expected utility” in the exclusive sense.
17For a review of such results, see for instance Chateauneuf et al., 1997, Section 3.2.
18See Allais, 1953 (and empirical data in, e.g., Camerer, 1992 and 1995, Section III.D).
The results of the lotteries displayed must be interpreted in significant units of money
(e.g., thousands of dollars).
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p1 100
1
≻ q1
500
10
100
100
89
100
0
1
100
& r1
100
11
100
0
89
100 ≺ s1
500
10
100
0
90
100
Figure 1 – the first Allais paradox
p2 100
1
≻ q2
500
80
100
0
20
100 & r2
100
5
100
0
95
100 ≺ s2
500
4
100
0
96
100
Figure 2 – the second Allais paradox
On the face of it, there does not seem to be any interesting connection
between the paradoxical preferences above and the risk attitudes previously
defined. Admittedly, if < is classic, then either P1 ≻ Q1 or P2 ≻ Q2 excludes
any form of risk seeking.19 But this does not get to the point of the Allais
paradoxes, namely, the combinations of preferences P1 ≻ Q1 and R1 ≺ S1,
and P2 ≻ Q2 and R2 ≺ S2. These combinations prove compatible with the
presence of strong strict risk aversion as well as the absence of weak strict
risk aversion. These are the two extremes of what remains possible in the
risk attitude spectrum, given the exclusion of risk seeking (and that of risk
neutrality, which has already been explained).20 This is a direct illustration
of the fact that there is no compelling link between the paradoxical prefer-
19Consider, e.g., the second paradox. Recalling (2), assume by way of contradiction
that the decision-maker is weakly risk seeking. Then, by definition of weak risk seeking,
Q2 < δE(Q2). From this, the fact that E(Q2) = 400 and P2 ≻ Q2, and transitivity, it
follows that δ100 ≻ δ400. This contradicts the fact that < is strictly increasing in C.
20This can be established by algebraic examples. Let D and D′ be two decision-makers
to whom the rank-dependent utility model applies. Let them be characterized by the
same utility function, u(c) =
√
c, together with the probability weighting functions
wD(p) = 1−√1− p and wD′(p) = √p/(√p +
√
1− p)2, respectively (wD comes from
Segal, 1987, p. 149, while wD′ , with a typical inverse-S shaped graph, comes from Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992, p. 309). The functional form of rank-dependent utility (which I will
recall in footnote 34) implies that both D and D′ have the paradoxical preferences. How-
ever, it can be proved that D is strongly risk averse (see Chew et al., 1987, Corollary 2),
while D′ is not even weakly so (see Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994, Corollary 1).
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ences and any particular risk attitude. As a result, while decision theorists
are accustomed to describing the Allais paradoxes in terms of risk attitudes,
their descriptions do not seem to stand up to scrutiny – at least when these
descriptions are examined with reference to the prevailing technical defi-
nitions.21 Variations on the Allais paradoxes could permit extending this
discussion of the divide between expected and non-expected utility to a sim-
ilar discussion of the divide between the various non-expected utility models.
The latter discussion would likewise lead to apparently negative conclusions
on the axiomatic significance of risk attitudes.
The most convincing interpretation of this negative evidence is that
the decision models are by and large neutral between the various risk at-
titudes. The history of expected utility theory puts this neutrality in an in-
teresting perspective. First, the expected utility model was introduced, in the
wake of the discussions of the St. Petersburg paradox, essentially to allow for
not only risk neutrality, but also risk aversion. Risk neutrality is imposed by
the model in which decision-makers maximize the expectation of their gains,
rather than, more generally, the expectation of the utility of their gains.
The less general model was the main source of the St. Petersburg paradox.22
Second, one important breakthrough made possible by the late axiomatiza-
tion of the expected utility model was the realization that this model could
accommodate not only risk aversion, but also risk seeking. Some scholars,
under the confusing influence of ideas of decreasing marginal utilities, had
previously claimed the contrary. However, once a representation theorem is
available, it becomes clear that only the expectation formula is essential to
the model, unlike any particular property of the utility function of which the
expectation is taken. In the expected utility model, this is tantamount to
showing that risk seeking is possible.23 Similar remarks could put the his-
tory of non-expected utility theory in similar perspective. The neutrality of
the decision models between the various risk attitudes is one thread in the
history of decision theory at large.
3 Risk Attitude Analysis in Axiomatic Analysis
However well-founded, the preceding remarks need to be qualified. As I now
show, there is more to the risk attitude concepts than these remarks suggest.
21See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 267 or Loomes and Sugden, 1982, p. 806.
22The above is meant not as a precise historical statement, but as a suggestive rational
reconstruction. Seidl, 2013 reviews the history of the St. Petersburg paradox up to the
present.
23This is due to the characterization of absolute risk attitude in expected utility (which
primarily leads back to Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). Shortly after von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s groundbreaking axiomatization of expected utility (1947, Appendix), Fried-
man and Savage (1948) were among the first to stress the compatibility between expected
utility and risk seeking. This compatibility had previously been denied, most prominently
by Marshall (see, e.g., Marshall, 1890, Mathematical Appendix, Note IX).
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3.1 The Conditional Variation in Risk Attitude
Consider again the idea that each lottery has a certainty equivalent. As
illustrated in Section 1.2, this idea can be used to introduce all the risk at-
titude concepts, starting with the fundamental concept of comparative risk
aversion. Certainty equivalents naturally generalize to conditional certainty
equivalents.24 I will denote conditional certainty equivalents by CCE(P, · ),
and I will define them as follows: CCE(P,R) = c if, for some α ∈ [0, 1]
and some Q,R ∈ ∆(C) such that R = αP + (1− α)Q, it is the case that
αP + (1 − α)Q ∼ αδc + (1− α)Q. In words, instead of identifying a cer-
tainty equivalent for P only when P is considered in isolation, do so also
when P is one of two lotteries, the convex combination of which forms some
lottery R. Any classic preference relation can be associated with exactly one
conditional certainty equivalent function. In general, the conditional cer-
tainty equivalent assigned by this function to a lottery P can vary with
both Q, the lottery with which P is combined, and α, the weight of P
in the combination. Clearly, such variations are excluded if VNM indepen-
dence is respected. In this case, one need not distinguish between conditional
certainty equivalents and unconditional certainty equivalents, as traditional
certainty equivalents might now be called. The distinction is necessary, how-
ever, whenever VNM independence is violated. Those are the cases that will
garner the most attention here.
Equipped with the concept of conditional certainty equivalent, one can
revisit the Allais paradoxes. They are said to display, respectively, the so-
called common consequence and common ratio effects. This is because the
lotteries giving rise to the paradoxical preferences can be decomposed as
shown in Figures 3 and 4.
p1
l1
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1
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89
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100
1
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11
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11
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100
100
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100 100
1
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0
1
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11
01
11
l3
89
100
0
1
Figure 3 – the first Allais paradox analyzed
24To my knowledge, Machina was the first to explicitly introduce conditional certainty
equivalents (Machina, 1982, p. 288).
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Figure 4 – the second Allais paradox analyzed
In the first paradox, L1 is a “common consequence” of both P1 and Q1,
and L3 is a common consequence of both R1 and S1. In the second paradox,
1 and .05 constitute a “common ratio” by which both M1 and M2 are com-
bined withM3 to yield, respectively, P2 and Q2, and R2 and S2. A preference
reversal occurs with a change in either the other lottery entering the combi-
nation (the common consequence) or the combination weight (the common
ratio). Both cases are excluded by the respect of VNM independence.25
From the first set of paradoxical preferences (and the fact that clas-
sic preferences respect first-order stochastic dominance), one can infer that
CCE(L2, Q1) < 100 < CCE(L2, S1). The conditional certainty equivalent of
L2 varies depending on whether L2 is combined with L1, which offers the
decision-maker a significant gain (100), or with L3, which offers her noth-
ing at all (0). This variation occurs while all the combination weights are
the same. The decision-maker has an identical probability of .89 of being
offered, respectively, the significant gain or nothing. More specifically, com-
paring those conditional certainty equivalents indicates that the paradoxical
decision-maker is more risk averse in the first case than in the second. This
follows from the definition of comparative risk aversion, applied not to two
decision-makers facing the same choice situation, but to one decision-maker
facing two different choice situations (as micro-economists do when they
study the effects of income variations on individual risk attitudes).
Similarly, one can deduce from the second set of paradoxical prefer-
ences that CE(M2) = CCE(M2, Q2) < 100 < CCE(M2, S2). The uncondi-
tional certainty equivalent ofM2 differs from the conditional certainty equiv-
alent of M2 taken as one of the convex components of S2. Again, the para-
doxical decision-makers are more risk averse in the first case than in the
second. This second variation occurs while all the combined lotteries are the
same. In the first case, the prevailing combination weights highlight the sure
prospect of a significant gain (100), while in the second case, they highlight
the quasi-certainty of ending up with nothing (0).
It is noteworthy that, according to a widely held intuition, the decision-
25Admittedly, Machina, 1983 and others have a more restrictive definition of the common
consequence and the common ratio effects. The simpler definition above suffices for my
purposes. Machina, 1982, p. 288 sketches the subsequent analysis of the Allais paradoxes.
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makers in the Allais paradoxes act more like gamblers in the second cases
than in the first cases, because in the second cases, they have nothing to lose
and everything to gain. As illustrated in the two previous paragraphs, the
concept of conditional certainty equivalent captures this intuition in terms
of the prevailing technical concepts of risk attitude.26
Based on the preceding analysis, I propose the following terminology. The
Allais paradoxes display a form of conditionally varying risk attitude. This
idea sheds light not only on the Allais paradoxes and the divide between ex-
pected and non-expected utility. This idea illuminates the theory of decision-
making under risk as a whole. In the case of classic preferences, it proves
equivalent to impose the respect of VNM independence or the constancy
of conditional certainty equivalents. The easy direction of this equivalence
(the necessity claim) has already been mentioned, the other direction (the
sufficiency claim) requires a proof that can be found in the literature.27 The
authors of this proof show more than this equivalence. They establish that
the two main branches of non-expected utility theory, i.e., the previously
mentioned betweenness and co-monotonic branches, can also be cast in this
axiomatic mold. They show that the various ways in which the models in
those branches of non-expected utility theory constrain classic preferences
are various ways of restraining the possible variation of conditional certainty
equivalents, i.e., the conditional variation in risk attitude. They highlight
that their results allow for further unifying the axiomatic theory of choice
under risk. I, for my part, stress that such unification is made possible by
one risk attitude concept. With the various possible patterns of conditional
variation in risk attitude, the risk attitude concepts come into play at the
key step of the decision theorists’ representation theorems.
However, notice that this step pertains to comparative risk attitude only.
The underlying absolute risk attitudes are irrelevant. Indeed, what is true
of unconditional certainty equivalents is also true of conditional certainty
equivalents. A decision-maker might prove to be more risk averse in a first
situation than in a second one, more risk seeking in a second situation than in
a third one, and so on. Yet those conditional comparative attitudes need not
take the form of any of the canonical absolute risk attitudes. In particular,
the underlying preferences might be non-classifiable.
26In particular, the descriptions of the Allais paradoxes referred to in footnote 21 can
be made precise using the concept of conditional certainty equivalent.
27See Chew and Epstein, 1989 (corrected by Chew et al., 1993). Thus Machina is justi-
fied in calling the independence axiom “the requirement of constant conditional certainty
equivalents” (Machina, 1982, p. 298). Although it is not fully axiomatized (but see the
recent results in Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2016), the decision model proposed by Machina
would also support the present analysis. Its key assumption (Machina, 1982, Hypothesis II,
p. 300) is about comparative risk attitude.
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3.2 The Strengthening of Risk Attitudes
The present sub-section goes one step further than the previous one by
stressing that even the absolute risk attitude concepts play a significant ax-
iomatic role. The absolute risk attitudes will even be seen to open more new
perspectives than the comparative risk attitudes, discussed in the previous
sub-section. Recall the various kinds of risk reduction. For the sake of con-
creteness, consider decision-makers who systematically opt for (rather than
against) at least one kind of risk reduction, say, the simplest of all, namely,
total risk reduction. Recall that always opting for total risk reductions does
not preclude one from consistently opting against some merely partial risk re-
ductions. There is more to this fact, however, than a definitional remark. To
see why, consider the variation on the second Allais paradox in Figure 5.
Assume that the paradoxical decision-maker is weakly risk averse.28
p3 500
1
≻ q3
10001
2
0
1
2
& r3
500
2
100
0
98
100 ≺ s3
1000
1
100
0
99
100
Figure 5 – variation on the second Allais paradox
One can check that P3 RRA Q3, R3 RRA S3, and P3 RRT Q3, but not
R3 RRT S3. The decision-maker opts for all total risk reductions (whence
her preferring P3 to Q3) but nonetheless opts against some merely partial
ones (since she prefers S3 to R3). I propose to say that a decision-maker
displays an intermediate risk attitude if, as in the present example, she sys-
tematically accepts (respectively, refuses) the risk reductions of a given kind
while refusing (respectively, accepting) some risk reductions of a less restric-
tive kind. In this particular instance, the intermediate risk attitude consists
in the fact that the decision-maker is weakly but not strongly risk averse.
The point of couching this case as an Allais paradox is to make vivid that
this intermediate risk attitude is incompatible with VNM independence, i.e.,
the constancy of conditional certainty equivalents. Notice indeed that for the
decision-maker in Figure 5, CE(Q3) < 500 < CCE(Q3, S3).
Importantly, the particular intermediate risk attitude thus illustrated
is not the only one to clash with expected utility. To see this, consider the
variation on the first Allais paradox in Figure 6. Assume that the paradoxical
decision-maker is not only weakly, but also moderately risk averse.29
28Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 267) consider a similar variation, yet without making
explicit the link with the absolute risk attitude concepts.
29Notice that unlike any of the Allais cases considered hitherto, this particular variation
features no certain option (like P1, P2, or P3).
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Figure 6 – variation on the first Allais paradox
One can check that P4 RRA Q4, R4 RRA S4, and P4 RRM Q4, but not
R4 RRM S4. Even though the decision-maker opts for all monotonic risk re-
ductions (as corroborated by her preferring P4 to Q4), she opts against some
more arbitrary ones (since she prefers S4 to R4). Accordingly, she is mod-
erately, but not strongly risk averse. As this variation illustrates, the above
intermediate risk attitude also induces a violation of VNM independence,
i.e., it is inconsistent with expected utility maximization.
Admittedly, the various forms of intermediate risk attitude are sufficient
but not necessary for VNM independence to be violated.30 They deserve to be
highlighted nonetheless, as they illustrate a topic of general axiomatic inter-
est. I propose to refer to this topic as the strengthening of risk attitudes. The
expected utility model illustrates the most extreme form of such strength-
ening. In this model, any weakly risk averse (respectively, seeking) decision-
maker must also be moderately so, and any moderately risk averse (respec-
tively, seeking) decision-maker must also be strongly so.31 Because of the
linearity in probabilities imposed by VNM independence, the chain of simple
implications in (2) becomes a series of equivalences. To the best of my knowl-
edge, no other classic model of choice under risk displays such rigidity. Ac-
cordingly, it might be that in the case of classic preferences, this rigidity
characterizes expected utility under a condition that would be interestingly
30Recall the algebraic examples in footnote 20. D illustrates that one can fail to respect
VNM independence while displaying all the degrees of risk aversion distinguished hitherto.
31It follows from Jensen’s inequality that, in expected utility, a decision-maker is weakly
risk averse if and only if the utility function u : C → R, the expectation of which represents
her preferences, is concave. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 show the less immediate result
that, in expected utility, a decision-maker is strongly risk averse if and only if u : C → R
is concave. Then, given (2), all the risk aversion concepts must be equivalent.
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weaker than VNM independence.32 This raises the following question. As-
sume that a classic preference relation < satisfies the following property:
(
∀P ∈ ∆(C), δE(P ) < P
)
⇒
(
∀P,Q ∈ ∆(C), P RRA Q⇒ P < Q
)
,
(
∀P ∈ ∆(C), P < δE(P )
)
⇒
(
∀P,Q ∈ ∆(C), P RRA Q⇒ Q < P
)
. (4)
The above axiom excludes any intermediate risk attitude. It effectively parti-
tions the set of all preference relations into only four categories, correspond-
ing to the following possibilities: non-classifiability, risk neutrality, strong
strict risk aversion, or strong strict risk seeking. To the best of my knowl-
edge, the following question has not been studied in the literature. What
are the necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that a classic preference
that respects the axiom in (4) also respects VNM independence? Answering
this question would better our understanding of the expected utility model
and shed light on the divide between expected and non-expected utility.
Expected utility is the only model known to impose the most extreme
form of risk attitude strengthening. However, less extreme forms thereof are
relevant for understanding other, non-expected utility models. One model be-
longing to the co-monotonic branch of non-expected utility theory deserves
particular attention. It is the so-called dual model of expected utility. The
duality in question consists in the following fact. The expected utility model
characterizes decision-makers merely by a transformation of the numerical
results and leaves the probability values untransformed. The dual model
characterizes decision-makers merely by a transformation of the probability
values and leaves the numerical results untransformed. In the dual model,
any weakly risk averse (respectively, seeking) decision-maker must also be
moderately so, but a moderately risk averse (respectively, seeking) decision-
maker needs not be strongly so.33 To this extent, the dual model proves par-
tially more flexible than expected utility as regards the intermediate risk atti-
tudes. Incidentally, I am unaware of any decision model that has been proved
to impose a form of partial risk attitude strengthening symmetric to the one
above, i.e., such that the weak risk attitudes do not necessarily generalize to
the moderate ones, but the moderate attitudes generalize to the strong ones.
32Clearly, this rigidity alone cannot characterize expected utility. Consider, e.g., the
class of all preference relations respecting the co-monotonic weakening of VNM indepen-
dence. Building on the results mentioned in footnote 20, one could easily define a sub-class
of classic preference relations displaying the two following properties. First, all relations
respect the axiom in (4). Second, no relation respects VNM independence.
33The dual model is due to Yaari (1987). Its transformation function concerns not the
direct probability values, but the decumulative ones. The dual model is a variant of the
more general rank-dependent utility model that generalizes expected utility, as described
in section 2. On the absolute risk attitudes in the dual model, see, e.g., Chateauneuf et
al., 1997, p. 35. Segal and Spivak, 1990 sheds light on why the dual model is more flexible
than expected utility, despite its being, like expected utility, a one-parameter model.
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The partial flexibility of the dual model is informative. It indicates that
the rigidity of expected utility with respect to the absolute risk attitudes
cannot boil down to the fact that it is a one-parameter model. Such is the
case of the dual model (with one function on probabilities, rather than on
results), that nonetheless displays greater flexibility, as I have just detailed.
The most significant results available to date on the strengthening of risk
attitudes concern the rank-dependent utility model, i.e., the general frame-
work of which both expected utility and its dual model are special cases. This
is a two-parameter framework, featuring both a function transforming the
numerical results and a function transforming the probability values. It has
been shown that in this model, the weak risk attitudes need not generalize
to the moderate ones, and the moderate risk attitudes need not generalize
to the strong ones.34 Thus, the chain of simple implications in (2) can be
verified as is. In other words, there is no automatic strengthening of the
absolute risk attitudes. In particular, unlike any model discussed hitherto,
the rank-dependent utility model can accommodate decision-makers that are
exactly weakly risk averse (respectively, seeking), i.e., those that opt for (re-
spectively, against) any total risk reduction while nonetheless opting against
(respectively, for) some merely monotonic ones.
The present state of the literature leaves it unclear, however, whether this
remarkable flexibility is due to the specific features of the rank-dependent
utility model. To clarify this, one would need to know whether there is any
model of choice under risk that (unlike rank-dependent utility) would impose
some form of risk attitude strengthening while being (like rank-dependent
utility) endowed with more than one parameter. I stress that such clarifica-
tion is not provided by the advocates of rank-dependent utility who stress the
flexibility described above. This is a missing argument in their defense. In-
deed, risk attitude strengthening might prove characteristic of one-parameter
models, such as expected utility or its dual model, and disappear in any
multi-parameter model. In that case, rank-dependent utility should not be
credited specifically, among all multi-parameter models, for the flexibility de-
scribed above. More generally, the topic of risk attitude strengthening would
prove of more limited axiomatic significance than my paper suggests.
34Recall the notation of footnote 15. Denote by GP the decumulative distribution
function of lottery P . The axioms of rank-dependent utility are satisfied if and only
if there exist two strictly increasing functions u : C → R and w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
the latter normalized at 0 and at 1, such that one can analyze v in (3) as
v(P ) =
∑n
i=1
[
w(GP (ci+1))−w(GP (ci))
]
u(ci). Expected utility corresponds to when
w(p) = p, for all p ∈ [0, 1]. The dual model corresponds to when u(c) = c, for all c ∈ C.
For a review on the absolute risk attitudes in rank-dependent utility, see Chateauneuf et
al., 1997, and see Ryan, 2006 for further results. Unlike the strong risk attitudes (Chew et
al., 1987) and the moderate risk attitudes (Chateauneuf et al., 2005), the weak risk atti-
tudes have not yet been characterized in the rank-dependent utility model. But the partial
results available (Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994 – see also Cohen and Meilijson, 2014) suf-
fice to establish that any intermediate risk attitude can be accommodated.
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Nevertheless, as I now show, the missing argument can be provided. Con-
sider the so-called cautious expected utility model, a multi-parameter model
which is contained neither in the betweenness, nor in the co-monotonic
branch of non-expected utility theory. In this model, decision-makers are
characterized not by one utility function on the set of results, like in the
expected utility model, but by a set of such functions. Decision-makers are
represented as choosing cautiously in the following sense: given any lottery,
they compute its expected utility according to each of their possible utility
functions, and they assign to the lottery the minimum of these expected util-
ities. This decision model rests on a surprisingly simple weakening of VNM
independence.35 Although the authors who recently axiomatized this model
do not consider this proposition, it can be proved that in this model, any
weakly risk seeking decision-maker must also be strongly (and hence mod-
erately) risk seeking, while weakly risk averse decision-makers need not be
strongly risk averse (whether or not they need to be moderately risk averse is
an open question).36 To my knowledge, both the fact that one model would
strengthen risk aversion and risk seeking asymmetrically, and the fact that
one model would strengthen one risk attitude from weak to strong outside
the expected utility realm, are exceptional in the literature.37
The case of the cautious expected utility model is thus particularly in-
structive. First, it highlights one rarely discussed aspect of the rigidity of
the expected utility model and its dual model, namely, that these models
strengthen risk aversion and risk seeking symmetrically. Second, it estab-
lishes that the flexibility of the rank-dependent utility model cannot boil
down to the fact that it is a multi-parameter model. Such is the case of the
cautious expected utility model (with a set of utility functions, rather than a
pair constituted by a utility function and a probability weighting function),
that nonetheless displays greater rigidity, as I have just detailed.
This example, however instructive, does not fully clarify the role of the
specific features of the rank-dependent utility model in the remarkable flex-
35The cautious expected utility model is due to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). Its key
axiom is the following weakening of VNM independence: for any c ∈ C, all P,R ∈ ∆(C),
and any α ∈ (0, 1], P < δc if and only if αP + (1− α)R < αδc + (1− α)R.
36Notice this implication of the axiom in footnote 35: for all P,R ∈ ∆(C), and any
α ∈ (0, 1], P < δE(P ) if and only if αP+(1−α)R < αδE(P )+(1−α)R. In the case of classic
preferences, the preference on the right-hand side proves equivalent to strong risk seeking
(see Chew and Mao, 1995, p. 413). Thus, in the cautious expected utility model, weak and
strong risk seeking are equivalent. However, for a decision-maker to be weakly risk averse
in this model, it suffices that one of her utility functions is concave, while strong risk
aversion requires that all of them are concave (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015, Theorem 3).
37Recently, Dean and Ortoleva (2017, p. 386-389) have introduced a new model that is
to some extent dual to the cautious expected utility model. In this new model, decision-
makers are characterized by one utility function and a set of probability weighting func-
tions. They choose cautiously in the sense above, but with reference to rank-dependent
utility, instead of expected utility. The properties of this model as regards the absolute risk
attitudes are currently unknown. It would be particularly interesting to investigate them.
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ibility it displays as regards the absolute risk attitudes. This is an unsettled
matter partly because of the lack of characterization results on the moderate
risk attitudes in the decision models that do not belong to the co-monotonic
branch of non-expected utility theory. In particular, I am unaware of any
such result for the multi-parameter models in the betweenness branch of
non-expected utility theory.38 For instance, the influential disappointment
aversion model features both a utility function and some proposed coeffi-
cient of disappointment aversion. It would be instructive to know how this
model accommodates the chain of implications in (2), i.e., whether it imposes
any form of risk attitude strengthening.
There seems to be a second way of trying to better our understanding of
the moderate risk attitudes, which prove central to the study of risk attitude
strengthening. A remarkable result in the literature characterizes the strong
risk attitudes for arbitrary classic preferences. This result is exceptional in
its applying at the level of generality of (3), i.e., across the variety of decision
models compared hitherto.39 More results of this kind would be invaluable for
the discussion of the present paper. Characterizing the weak risk attitudes for
arbitrary classic preferences appears to be a particularly difficult task. The
more restrictive case of the moderate risk attitudes constitutes, by contrast,
a natural next step. New light could be shed on risk attitude strengthening by
combining such general results, which pertain to any classic preference, and
the various characterizations of the decision models, which isolate particular
subclasses of classic preferences.
The discussion above illustrates that new results are called for. For all
that, the results currently available are sufficient to illustrate the axiomatic
relevance of the absolute risk attitude concepts. These available results –
apart from those on the exceptional case of the cautious expected utility
model – are summarized in Table 1. To read this table, it is helpful to recall
the chain of model-free implications in (2).
38Such results would be particularly instructive because the betweenness and the co-
monotonic branches of non-expected utility theory are disjoint, in the sense of having in
common only the expected utility model itself (see, e.g., Chew and Epstein, 1989, p. 208).
39See Chew and Mao, 1995 (with slightly different continuity requirements than those
assumed here). The key property in this characterization is Schur-concavity (see, e.g., Mar-
shall et al., 2010, Chapter 3), displayed by the function v in (3) when restricted to a dis-
tinguished subset of lotteries, namely, the set of all equiprobable lotteries. Apart from the
characterization results in Chateauneuf and Lakhnati, 2007, I am aware of only one other
result established at a similar level of generality, which is to be found in Cerreia-Vioglio
et al., 2016, Proposition 2 (the equivalence between (ii) and (iv)). There, it is established
that the strong risk aversion of a classic preference relation is equivalent to the weak risk
aversion of one of its distinguished subrelations, namely, its largest sub-relation respect-
ing VNM independence (together with transitivity and continuity, but not necessarily
completeness). The authors of this result do not compare it with that of Chew and Mao.
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❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
models
risk attitudes
weak, but not moderate moderate, but not strong
expected utility ✗ ✗
dual expected utility ✗ ✓
? ✓ ✗
rank-dependent utility ✓ ✓
Table 1 – the intermediate risk attitudes in various decision models
The intermediate risk attitudes give rise to several elegant impossibility re-
sults. These results establish that whenever preferences form such or such
simple pattern of risk attitude, there can be no functional form of such or
such type representing them. Consequently, as Table 1 illustrates, a typology
of the classic decision models can be proposed, based on their capacity to
allow for more or less refined risk attitudes, i.e., on their imposing more or
less radical forms of risk attitude strengthening. Thus, the concepts of abso-
lute risk attitude allow for systematic distinctions between decision models,
which is the primary purpose of axiomatic analysis.
Conclusion
On the face of it, the decision-theoretic concepts of risk attitude seem un-
able to account for the structural differences between the various models
of decision-making under risk. To this extent, these concepts do not seem
axiomatically significant. However, taking into account the conditional varia-
tion and the strengthening of risk attitudes leads to substantial qualifications
of this negative assessment. The decision models are only partially neutral
between the various risk attitudes, whence the axiomatic relevance of the con-
cepts introduced to describe those attitudes. Assessing the axiomatic status
of the risk attitude concepts also leads to the identification of several inter-
esting open questions, especially in connection with the strengthening of risk
attitudes. For a better assessment of the status of risk attitudes in axiomatic
decision theory, one would need not only to address these questions, but also
to consider other conditions than the ones focused on here. Specifically, it
would be necessary to discuss the risk attitude concepts also in the context of
non-classic preference relations (i.e., when neither unconditional nor condi-
tional certainty equivalent functions can be defined) and when the lotteries
offered to the decision-maker are defined over arbitrary sets of results (in
which case, the absolute risk attitudes cannot be defined in the usual way).
These are topics for future research.
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